Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-Market Basis by Brunson, Samuel D.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-2010
Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-Market Basis
Samuel D. Brunson
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investors on a Mark-to-Market Basis, 43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 507 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol43/iss2/2
TAXING INVESTORS ON A
MARK-TO-MARKET BASIS
Samuel D. Brunson*
Recognizing that mark-to-market accounting, with its close
approximation of Haig-Simons income, represents a better measure of a
taxpayer's income than realization accounting-the historical basis for
the federal income tax-Congress enacted section 475(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code. This section permits certain taxpayers to elect out of the
realization accounting regime and instead mark their investments to
market. Congress limited the availability of this election to taxpayers
who were engaged in the trade or business of trading securities.
Although the election must be made early in a taxpayer's taxable year,
the test for determining whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or
business of trading securities during a taxable year can only be
performed after the year ends. As the rules for making a mark-to-
market election are currently written, in order to determine whether she
qualifies to make the election, a taxpayer must know no later than April
15 what the extent of her trading activities will be for the rest of the
year, as well as for all future years. There is no compelling tax policy
reason to limit the availability of the mark-to-market election. Rather,
the superiority of mark-to-market accounting over the current
realization regime supports a policy of allowing (and encouraging)
taxpayers to determine their tax liability on a mark-to-market basis and
outweighs any objections to liberalizing the election's availability.
Alternatively, in the event that Congress decides that denying non-
traders the ability to elect mark-to-market treatment is justified,
Congress or the Treasury Department should adopt a proposed safe-
harbor provision that approximates the criteria courts consider when
determining whether a taxpayer is a trader, but that, unlike the current
trade-or-business test, can be applied in advance of the taxable year.
Although providing a safe harbor solely to traders is, from a policy
perspective, worse than making the mark-to-market election available
to all taxpayers, it is nonetheless better than the current unworkable
criteria because it provides certainty to taxpayers at the time they must
make the election.
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks to Alex
Raskolnikov for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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MARK- TO-MARKET TAXATION
I. INTRODUCTION
As a result of the recent implosion of mortgage-backed
securities and the subsequent debate over banks' balance sheets,
many Americans probably have some familiarity with mark-to-
market accounting, even if such familiarity is limited solely to
having heard the words strung together.' Still, many people are
aware that, until recently, banks were required to mark their assets to
market (whatever that means) and that this requirement could
(depending on whom one believes) lead to the collapse of the
remaining banks.
In the wake of the banking system's near collapse, little if any
time has been spent looking at mark-to-market accounting for tax
purposes, as opposed to financial accounting purposes-and perhaps
with good reason. Except when they facilitate fraud or catastrophe,
methods of accounting do not grip the public imagination. In any
event, tax accounting is essentially a settled matter. Realization
accounting-an accounting standard that does not require taxpayers
to pay tax on income until the year in which they receive the
income-is (and historically has been) the default position of the
1. E.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Battles over Reform Plan Lie Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2009, at B 1 ("Edward L. Yingling, president of the American Bankers Association, said he hoped
to use the meeting with Mr. Obama to make the case for relaxing mark-to-market rules, which
require financial institutions to value their investment securities at current market prices. Banks
have argued that the rules are hurting their financial positions."); Massimo Calabresi, Will a
Mark-to-Market Fix Save the Banks?, TIME, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.time.con/time/business/
article/0,8599,1884290,00.html; David Hendricks, Congress Hyacked Accounting Standards,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 18, 2009, at IC ("Some members of Congress think the
banking system is suffering under a rule called mark-to-market."); Michael Hiltzik, Rule Is No
Asset to Banks' Health, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at B5 ("This brings us to the concept of
'mark-to-market' accounting. If you haven't heard this term before, brace yourself, because you'll
be hearing it a lot over the next month or so."); Steve Forbes, How Steve Forbes Would Fix the
Economy, FORBES.COM, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/30/fannie-freddie-
mortgages-davos-intelligent-investing_0202_davos.html ("[O]ne of the things that the Obama
administration could get rid of is this strange accounting rule called mark-to-market, which has
devastated bank balance sheets."). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to determine
whether mark-to-market financial accounting is detrimental to banks, it is necessary to note that it
is not a foregone conclusion that mark-to-market accounting dragged down the U.S. economy.
E.g., Allan Sloan, Playing the Blame Game: Will Mark-to-Market Accounting Take the Fall for
the Wall Street Mess?, FORTUNE, Oct. 27, 2008, at 20 (arguing that mark-to-market accounting is
being used by banks as a scapegoat for the banks' poor investment decisions); Jonathon Weil,
Don't Blame "Mark to Market" for Banks' Problems, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 17, 2008,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnistweil&sid=aJFrPa3rqhH
w (debunking misinformation about mark-to-market accounting's effect on banks).
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U.S. tax system.2 Still, it is at most a second-best solution to the
question of when income should be taxed. The literature on tax
theory widely supports the notion that a mark-to-market system of
taxation "best measures Haig-Simons accretion to wealth and
therefore is the optimal method to tax income."3 In spite of the
theoretical superiority of mark-to-market accounting, this form of
accounting is unlikely to supplant realization accounting.4
Still, over the course of the last quarter century, Congress has
slowly introduced mark-to-market accounting into the taxation of
financial instruments and other investments, first by requiring
taxpayers to mark regulated futures, foreign currency, and certain
other contracts to market,5 and then by requiring dealers in securities
to mark their securities to market.6 In addition, dealers in
commodities and traders in securities or commodities may now elect
to mark their positions to market.7
2. David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (1998).
3. David S. Miller, A Progressive System of Mark-to-Market Taxation, 109 TAX NOTES
1047, 1053 (2005); see also Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57
TAX L. REV. 355, 355 (2004); David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative
Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1917-18 (2004). See generally
Fred B. Brown, "Complete" Accrual Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559 (1996) (outlining the
benefits and costs of accrual, or mark-to-market, taxation); Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income
Tax: An Agenda for Research, 77 TAx NOTES 967 (1997) (proposing research to replace
realization accounting with an expanded mark-to-market approach); Henry Ordower, Revisiting
Realization: Accretion Taxation, the Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VA. TAX
REV. 1 (1993) (arguing that despite potential benefits of other types of taxation, including mark-
to-market, realization accounting may be the only constitutional method of taxation); Clarissa
Potter, Mark-to-Market Taxation as the Way to Save the Income Tax-A Former Administrator's
View, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 879 (1999) (arguing that mark-to-market accounting better reflects
economic income than realization accounting and availability of the mark-to-market election
should be expanded); Schizer, supra note 2, at 1593-94 (stating that the regime most consistent
with the Haig-Simons definition of income is mark-to-market accounting); David J. Shakow,
Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986)
(proposing a form of accrual taxation, substantially similar to mark-to-market taxation, as the best
alternative to realization accounting); David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System,
53 TAX L. REV. 95 (1999) (referring to Haig-Simons and mark-to-market taxation
interchangeably as the ideal form of income taxation).
4. See Thomas L. Evans, The Realization Doctrine After Cottage Savings, 70 TAXES 897,
898 (1992) ("[A]n attempt to repeal the realization doctrine on a wholesale basis for individual
taxpayers would create such a firestorm of political opposition that few politicians would
seriously consider such a proposal.").
5. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34 § 503(a), 95 Stat. 172, 327-28
(1981) (codified at I.R.C. § 1256 (2006)).
6. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13223(a), 107 Stat.
312, 481-82 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 475 (2006)).
7. I.R.C. § 475(e)-(f).
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However, Congress stopped with traders, creating a significant
practical problem for taxpayers wishing to make the election: while
the boundary between a trader and an investor has been extensively
developed,8 it is worthless to a taxpayer who wants to elect mark-to-
market taxation. The test applies ex post facto, requiring a taxpayer
to look at the extent of her trading over the previous year to
determine whether she was a trader or an investor during that year.9
This prevents taxpayers from using the mark-to-market election
strategically because the election must be made long before the
taxable year ends and thus before the taxpayer can determine
whether she was a trader.
Moreover, it is unclear why investors should be prevented from
electing to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis. Congress did not
explain why it limited the election's availability, and in light of the
theoretical superiority and elective nature of mark-to-market
accounting, there is no policy reason to permit traders in securities to
mark their securities to market while limiting investors to realization
accounting.
This Article proposes an overhaul of the mark-to-market
election and offers three possible fixes to the problems inherent in
the current regime. As a best-case solution, this Article proposes
expanding the mark-to-market election to investors, thus mooting the
problem of determining ex ante whether a taxpayer qualifies as a
trader in securities. In the alternative, if Congress decides for policy
or other reasons that it prefers to limit the availability of the election
to traders, continuing to exclude investors, this Article proposes that
Congress enact an ex ante qualification test to replace the current ex
post trader test. Finally, if Congress decides to do nothing, this
Article proposes that the U.S. Department of the Treasury issue
regulations creating an ex ante safe harbor. Although the regulatory
solution is the least ambitious, at the very least it would allow
taxpayers certainty in making the mark-to-market election.
In Part II, this Article describes the theoretical underpinnings of
mark-to-market accounting and some reasons a taxpayer would make
the election. Part III describes the use of "trade or business" in the
Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") and the criteria that distinguish
8. See Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
9. I.R.C. § 475(f).
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a trader from an investor. Part IV discusses recent cases in which
courts have applied the broader trade-or-business jurisprudence to an
election under section 475(f) of the Code. Part V discusses the
problems with the judicial test for a trade or business in general, and
the problems with its application in the context of late mark-to-
market elections in particular. Finally, Part VI presents proposals for
improving the mark-to-market election.
II. MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING
REFLECTS HAIG-SIMONS INCOME
If a taxpayer is subject to mark-to-market accounting, she treats
all of the securities she owns at the end of each taxable year as if she
had sold them at fair market value. 10 Although realization accounting
is "firmly entrenched" in the federal income tax, " in 1993, Congress
passed section 475, which requires dealers in securities to mark the
securities they hold in their capacities as dealers to market. 12
Congress decided that, under section 475, gains or losses are taken
into account as ordinary income or loss for the year, except to the
extent that the gains or losses occur on securities contracts governed
by section 1256.13
Mark-to-market accounting is a significant departure from the
realization accounting generally applied to calculate federal income
tax liability. Because it comes closer to taxing Haig-Simons income 
14
10. I.R.C. § 475(a).
11. Eric D. Chason, Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of Option Taxation,
27 VA. TAX REv. 135, 166 (2007).
12. Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13223(a), 107 Stat. 312,
481-82 (1993) (codified at I.R.C. § 475).
13. I.R.C. § 475(d)(3)(A)(i). I.R.C. § 1256 governs certain futures contracts and options.
Any contract governed by I.R.C. § 1256 is marked to market annually, absent any election, I.R.C.
§ 1256(b), with 40 percent of any gains or losses treated as short-term capital gain and 60 percent
as long-term capital gain, I.R.C. § 1256(a)(3). For purposes of I.R.C. § 475, the term "security"
includes derivative contracts on securities, but expressly leaves out contracts to which section
1256(a) applies. Id. § 475(c)(2). A securities trader who elects mark-to-market accounting can
therefore continue to mark her section 1256 contracts to market and recognize capital, rather than
ordinary, gain or loss on those positions. The definition of "commodity," however, does not
mention section 1256 contracts, see id. § 475(e)(2), and the Treasury Department takes the
position that an electing commodity dealer or trader must take into account annually the change in
value of her section 1256 contracts on commodities as ordinary (not capital) income or loss. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.475(f)-2(e)(2), 64 Fed. Reg. 4374, 4374 (Jan. 28, 1999).
14. The Haig-Simons definition of income "is now the generally accepted definition of
income on which virtually all income tax theory is predicated." William J. Turnier, Theory Meets
Reality: The Case of the Double Tax on Material Capital, 27 VA. TAX REv. 83, 87 (2007). Under
that definition, "[p]ersonal income [is] the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
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and thus is a more ideal regime under which to calculate a taxpayer's
income tax liability as compared to traditional realization
accounting, ," most commentators agree that mark-to-market
accounting reflects a person's income better than realization
accounting. 16 Furthermore, because under mark-to-market
accounting a taxpayer is taxed on all of her investments annually, 7
the tax law disrupts her choices less than realization accounting. That
is, realization accounting produces a timing option: at the end of any
taxable year, realization accounting creates an incentive for a
taxpayer to sell depreciated securities in order to realize her loss
(thereby offsetting a portion of her income for the year) even if,
absent tax considerations, she would prefer to continue to hold the
securities. , At the same time, realization accounting produces a
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question." Id. (quoting HENRY SIMONS, PERSONAL
INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 61-62
(1938)).
15. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the
Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (2004) ("Mark-to-market, or accrual taxation, is the
normative ideal of a Haig-Simons income tax, and many commentators support moving in that
direction to the extent it is administratively feasible to do so.").
16. Samuel D. Brunson, Elective Taxation of Risk-Based Financial Instruments: A Proposal,
8 HOuS. BuS. & TAX L.J. 1, 27 (2007). Some commentators suggest discussions of tax policy are
starting to look beyond a Haig-Simons concept of income, especially in developing household
taxation. Daniel N. Shaviro, Households and the Fiscal System, in TAXATION, ECONOMIC
PROSPERITY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 185-86 (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., &
Jeffrey Paul eds., 2006). But an argument that unrealized gains "do not constitute income ... is
untenable. Suppose I continue to hold an investment which has appreciated in value instead of
realizing the gain, This is equivalent to my realizing the gain and reinvesting in the same asset."
R. A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44,49 (1967).
17. I.R.C. § 475(a).
18. See Schizer, supra note 2, at 1557-60 (discussing the lock-in effect). In fact, a number of
provisions exist in the Code in response to such arbitrage transactions, including the straddle and
wash sale rules. Under realization accounting, and absent the straddle rules, a taxpayer could own
offsetting positions-for example, XYZ stock purchased at $100 and a put on XYZ stock at $98.
If, on December 28, 2010, XYZ stock were worth $105, the taxpayer could sell the put, while
waiting until January 1, 2011, to sell the stock. Unless there were catastrophic movement in the
market over the course of those three days, she would have, under realization accounting,
triggered her loss in 2010, without recognizing the corresponding gain until 2011. Congress
enacted the straddle rules, which generally disallow the loss on a straddle in any given year
except to the extent it exceeds the unrealized gain in the offsetting position. I.R.C. § 1092(a)
(2006). The remaining portion of the loss is carried forward until the year in which the taxpayer
recognizes the gain.
Alternatively, assume the taxpayer is long in XYZ stock with no offsetting short position.
She believes that over the long term, the stock will go up and she intends to hold her XYZ stock
for at least five years. On December 28, 2010, however, she notices the XYZ stock is $5 below
the price at which she purchased it. She decides to sell, realizes her loss, and repurchases the
same number of shares on January 2, 2011, for roughly the same price as that at which she sold it,
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lock-in effect on gain positions irrespective of whether the taxpayer
wants to continue holding the appreciated assets: because selling the
security is a taxable event, the tax law gives her an incentive to
continue to hold the security and defer any tax. '9
In addition, mark-to-market accounting does not require
someone who makes significant numbers of trades to keep track of
the individual basis of each of the securities she holds. Effectively, at
the end of every year, the bases reset as the year's gains and losses
net against each other and are realized. 20
Mark-to-market accounting also helps taxpayers avoid several
loss-deferral regimes, including the wash sale rules.2" In general,
under the wash sale rules, if a taxpayer sells a security at a loss and
acquires (or purchases an option or enters into a contract to acquire)
substantially identical securities within the sixty-one-day period
beginning thirty days before the sale, the taxpayer has entered into a
wash sale, and the deduction for the loss is disallowed.22 Under
mark-to-market accounting, however, the wash sale rules do not
apply. 23
The mark-to-market regime taxes a trader's gains at ordinary
rather than capital gains rates. 24 It balances this less-favorable
treatment by characterizing losses as ordinary and fully deductible. 25
thus effectively realizing her loss while retaining any upside potential. Congress addressed this in
the wash sale rules, which disallow a loss where, in the sixty-one-day period beginning thirty
days before the sale, a taxpayer acquires or contracts to acquire substantially identical stock or
securities. I.R.C. § 1091 (2006).
If she were a trader who had elected to mark her securities to market, however, both the
straddle rules and the wash sale rules would be superfluous as applied to her. At the end of each
taxable year, instead of the taxpayer having an incentive to dispose of loss positions while
keeping gain positions, all gains and losses would net each other out, without respect to any sale
or other disposition.
19. In fact, under I.R.C. § 1014(a)(1), if she holds an appreciated security until her death, her
heirs will inherit the appreciated security with a tax basis equal to its fair market value as of the
date of her death. Any appreciation in the value of the security as of that date remains
permanently untaxed. IRC. § 1014(a)(1) (2006).
20. I.R.C. § 475().
21. Steven M. Rosenthal, Applying the Mark-to-Market Rules: New Problems, New Issues
Cause Growing Pains, 88 J. TAX'N 207, 210 (1998).
22. I.R.C. § 1091(a) (2006).
23. Id. § 475(d)(1).
24. Id. § 475(d)(3)(A)(i).
25. This would create arbitrage opportunities if a trader were allowed to make a section
475(f) election after she knew how the year progressed. See infra Part V.
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Because securities are risky investments,26 a trader does not know
when she purchases a security or enters into a financial instrument
whether she will have a gain or a loss. 27 As long as the loss is fully
deductible, however, in any particular year she is largely indifferent
to the tax rate. 28
Along with its advantages, mark-to-market accounting presents
two significant difficulties. First, it requires an electing trader to
accurately value her securities at the end of each year. 29 Valuing her
securities takes time, effort, and money. Unless all of the trader's
securities are publicly traded, valuing securities may be difficult to
do. Further, for most investors, realization accounting has one
significant advantage over paying taxes on Haig-Simons income: no
tax is imposed unless an investor has actually received money (or, in
certain cases, other property), 30 and therefore the investor has the
26. Calling securities "risky" is not an entirely accurate statement. While the return on
certain financial instruments is entirely risk based, the return on others, including common stock,
is a combination of a time-value return and a risk-based return. See David I. Walker, Is Equity
Compensation Tax Advantaged?, 84 B.U. L. REV. 695, 718 (2004) ("Over the long haul stock
prices rise to repay investors for the time value of their money and their assumption of risk.").
However, the time-value portion of return becomes most relevant only in the long term. See, e.g.,
FRANK ARMSTRONG III, THE INFORMED INVESTOR 33 (2002) ("[M]arket risk is a short-term risk
that dramatically decreases over time."). Moreover, while it may nonetheless be preferable in a
mark-to-market environment to separate the risk-based return from the time-value return, it is
beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to delineate a bright line between the portion of a
security's return that constitutes a time-value-based return and the portion that constitutes a risk-
based return. For purposes of addressing the problems in the current elective mark-to-market
regime, this Article will ignore the time-value component of investment returns.
27. It seems obvious that a trader would only purchase a security or enter into a financial
instrument if she expected to earn a profit because of it, and she likely believes (subjectively) in
her own ability to choose winning positions. Because the return on financial instruments is
principally risk based (as opposed to plain-vanilla debt, for example, where the return is time
based, or wage income, which is paid based on a person's work and efforts), it is not objectively
obvious in advance that the value will go up in spite of any particular taxpayer's optimism or past
track record.
28. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 16, at 28-29; cf Schizer, supra note 3, at 1897-98. At
ordinary rates (using the highest federal marginal rate of tax), a gain of $100 will result in a tax
liability of $35, whereas a loss of $100 will result in a deduction of $35. Because she does not
know in advance whether she will have a gain or loss, and because the loss is worth as much to
her as the gain, an economically rational taxpayer (mostly) does not care what the tax rate is.
With financial instruments, she is entirely indifferent: because they are inherently levered, she can
choose the after-tax return she wants and costlessly scale her investment up so that she will
achieve that return. In order to scale up an investment in common stock, on the other hand, she
would have to purchase two shares instead of one, which, while providing a scaled-up after-tax
return, has additional up-front cost. Nonetheless, although she may prefer the higher return
associated with long-term capital rates on gains, she also prefers the full deductibility and
ordinary rate on losses, so that mark-to-market is, at worst, a wash for her economically.
29. See I.R.C. § 475(o.
30. See generally Schizer, supra note 2.
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liquidity to pay the tax. Under a mark-to-market regime, tax is
imposed annually, whether or not the taxpayer has sold any securities
or otherwise received any money, and even if the taxpayer's
investments are entirely in illiquid assets. Still, despite the
administrative difficulties of being taxed on both realized and
unrealized gains and losses, mark-to-market accounting reflects
income better than realization accounting. 32
Several years after making mark-to-market accounting
mandatory for dealers in securities, Congress made the same mark-
to-market treatment available to traders in securities and to dealers
and traders in commodities under an elective regime. Congress
decided to give traders the option to mark their securities to market
because it believed that mark-to-market accounting provides a "clear
reflection of income with respect to assets that are traded in
established markets" and because mark-to-market accounting offers
fewer opportunities for manipulation. 33
A mark-to-market election may be made separately for each of
the trader's trades or businesses. In order to elect mark-to-market
treatment, a trader who is an individual or an existing entity must
make the election no later than the due date of the tax return for the
year prior to the year the election will be effective, which is April 15
and March 15, respectively, for individuals and business entities. " A
newly formed entity must state in its books and records, no later than
two months and fifteen days after the beginning of its first taxable
year that it has made the election, and it must also include the
election with its tax return for its first year. " Once made, the election
is effective for the year of the election and all subsequent tax years
and is irrevocable except with the consent of the commissioner of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).36 An electing trader may designate
31. See Miller, supra note 3, at 1053.
32. See Musgrave, supra note 16, at 49 ("It is clear conceptually that unrealized gains
constitute income, and a taxable income concept which in principle considers unrealized gains as
nonincome is not a valid equity concept. To be sure, administrative difficulties do not permit full
implementation of this principle, but recognition of what should be done in principle-
temporarily disregarding administrative difficulties-is crucial in choosing between alternative
feasible solutions." (citation omitted)).
33. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 180 (Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter 1997 BLUE BOOK].
34. Rev. Proc. 99-17 § 5.03(1), 1999-1 C.B. 503.
35. Id. § 5.03(2).
36. I.R.C. § 475(f)(3) (2006).
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certain securities that are held for purposes other than the trade or
business of securities trading. Any securities so designated will not
be marked to market and will be subject to tax as if the trader had not
made an election.
Making mark-to-market accounting elective for traders solves
the biggest practical problems raised by mark-to-market accounting.
Congress believed that exchange-traded securities had determinable
market values and further believed that traders regularly calculated
the year-end values of their assets in determining their income for
financial-reporting purposes.38 In addition, the fact that mark-to-
market accounting is an elective regime means that traders who elect
section 475(f) know what to expect. Upon electing mark-to-market
accounting, they are affirming that they are willing and able to value
their trading portfolios annually and that they will have the liquidity
necessary to pay taxes that come due.
III. TRADE OR BUSINESS
If a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of trading
securities, she is considered a "trader" for tax purposes. 39 If she is not
engaged in this trade or business, she is considered an "investor" and
a number of different tax rules apply to her. 4 The phrase "trade or
business" appears frequently in the Code and the Treasury
regulations. 41 In spite of its relative importance, however, the phrase
is not defined in either place and has not been defined by the
courts. 42 Rather, the determination of whether a taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business is generally made using a facts-and-
circumstances test. 4' This test has been extensively developed by the
37. Id. § 475(f)(1)(B).
38. 1997 BLUE BOOK, supra note 33, at 180-81.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See F. Ladson Boyle, What Is a Trade or Business?, 39 TAX LAW. 737, 737 (1986)
(stating that, as of the writing of the Article, "trade or business" appeared in at least 492 sections
of the Code and 664 regulations).
42. Id. at 738. It is worth noting that "trade or business" is not the only important concept in
the Code without a statutory or regulatory definition. For example, neither "insurance" nor
"insurance contract" is defined in the Code or in the Treasury regulations. Instead, taxpayers must
derive a definition from judicial statements. Rev. Rul. 2008-8, 2008-1 C.B. 340.
43. See Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941) (explaining that determining whether
the activities of a taxpayer qualify as "carrying on a business" requires an examination of the
facts in each case).
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judiciary 4 and analyzed in scholarly literature.45 Still, the test is fact
intensive, and the result is often unclear, consisting of, among other
things, the number of trades made in a year, the frequency of those
trades, and the investment objective.
As difficult as the trade-or-business criteria may be to apply
after the close of the taxable year, this Article demonstrates that they
are impossible to apply prior to the end of the year, as is required in
order to make the mark-to-market election.46 In order to provide
taxpayers with certainty when they want to elect to be taxed on a
mark-to-market basis, it is necessary for the Code to provide
certainty about who may elect mark-to-market taxation.
Uses of "Trade or Business" in the Code
In order for a taxpayer to be engaged in a trade or business, it is
insufficient for the taxpayer to merely seek a profit. Rather, "[t]he
phrase 'trade or business' must refer ... to extensive activity over a
substantial period of time during which the [t]axpayer holds himself
out as selling goods or services." 47 Traditionally, courts and the IRS
have looked to four factors to determine whether a taxpayer is
engaged in a trade or business: (1) a profit motive; (2) extensive
activity sustained for a substantial period of time; (3) whether the
activity has already begun; and (4) whether the taxpayer holds
herself out as engaged in the selling of goods and services. "
These criteria do not apply perfectly to the business of trading in
securities. In order to differentiate an investor in securities from a
trader in securities, courts generally look to whether one purchases
securities to be held for capital appreciation and income (without
44. See generally E. John Lopez, Note, Defining "Trade or Business" Under the Internal
Revenue Code: A Survey of Relevant Cases, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949 (1984) (surveying a
broad cross section of trade-or-business cases).
45. See, e.g., Steven R. Lainoff, Stephen Bates & Chris Bowers, Attributing the Activities of
Corporate Agents Under US. Tax Law: A Fresh Look from an Old Perspective, 38 GA. L. REV.
143, 159-68 (2003); Carol Duane Olson, Toward a Neutral Definition of "Trade or Business " in
the Internal Revenue Code, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1199 (1986); Mark A. Rentenbach & Joseph A.
Sowell Ill, In the Trade or Business of an Isolated Sale of Real Estate, 51 TENN. L. REV. 319,
335-43 (1984); Glenn P. Schwartz, How Many Trades Must a Trader Make to Be in the Trading
Business?, 22 VA. TAX REV. 395, 415-23 (2003).
46. See, e.g., Rentenbach & Sowell, supra note 45, at 319 ("The presumptive approach of
courts and commentators to the issue of. .. property for sale in the normal course of a trade or
business[] should be stripped of its patented formulas and reexamined.").
47. McDowell v. Ribicoff, 292 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1961).
48. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 739.
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significant regard to the short-term swings in the market), in which
case one is an investor, or whether one buys and sells securities
frequently in order to exploit and profit from short-term market
swings, in which case one is a trader. 49 The cases offer no bright-line
rule for the number or frequency of trades above which a taxpayer
will qualify as a trader. There are, however, clear examples of levels
of activity that are insufficient to support a claim that a taxpayer is a
trader. For example, two trades over the course of a year are
generally insufficient to allow a person to qualify as a trader. 50
The proper classification of a taxpayer becomes less clear as the
quantity of a taxpayer's trades increases. In Moller v. United States, 5
for example, the court accepted that Mr. and Mrs. Moller treated
their investment activities as full-time jobs, each spending
approximately forty hours per week monitoring the stock market and
making investment decisions. 52 In one year, they purchased securities
in eighty-three transactions and sold securities in another forty-one.
The next year, they engaged in seventy-six purchase and thirty sale
transactions. " However, the court determined that they were
primarily seeking long-term growth and that they derived the bulk of
their income from interest and dividends rather than from trading. 5"
The court therefore found that they were not engaged in the trade or
business of trading securities and that they were investors and not
traders. "
49. Mayer v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 149, 154 (1994) (citing Moller v. United States, 721
F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
50. Spring v. United States, 38 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 76-5533, 76-5536 (E.D. Tex. 1976). The
court noted that, in addition to entering into merely two capital transactions during the year in
question, plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Spring held both securities for more than six months before
selling them. In the court's opinion, this clearly demonstrated that they were not trying to profit
from short-term swings in the market. Id. at 76-7735.
51. 721 F.2d 810. The Mollers (and other U.S. taxpayers) would prefer to be treated as
traders because section 162 permits a traders to deduct "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a)
(2006). If the taxpayer's investment activities do not qualify as a trade or business, on the other
hand, she is considered an investor rather than a trader, and her investment expenses are
miscellaneous itemized deductions. Id. § 67(b). If she is not a trader, then she may deduct only
her investment expenses if and to the extent that her aggregate miscellaneous itemized deductions
exceed 2 percent of her adjusted gross income. Id. § 67(a). Therefore, it is in a domestic
taxpayer's best interest to be considered a trader in securities, rather than merely an investor.
52. Moller, 721 F.2d at 811.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 812.
55. Id. at814.
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In Estate of Yaeger v. Commissioner, 56 the court sussed out from
the various trade-or-business precedents "two fundamental criteria
that distinguish traders [in securities] from investors": the length of
time a putative trader holds the securities and the source of her
profit. 17 Like the Moller court, the court here acknowledged that Mr.
Yaeger had "pursued his security activities vigorously and
extensively."" Mr. Yaeger had also carried a significant margin of
debt related to his investment activities;59 moreover, he had initiated
more than two thousand securities transactions over the course of the
two years in dispute,6 ° more than fifteen times the number of
transactions the Mollers had entered into over the same period of
time.
Nonetheless, the court held that Mr. Yaeger had not been
engaged in the trade or business of trading securities. 6 The court
based its decision on two factors. First, Mr. Yaeger held most of his
securities for more than one year and held none for less than three
months. 62 Second, although he earned some income from dividends
and interest, he made most of his profit by holding undervalued stock
until the market improved.63 The court held that his emphasis on
capital growth and profit from the resale of securities indicated that
he was an investor rather than a trader. 6'
Although the court based its holding on its two fundamental
criteria, the opinion strongly suggests that the court viewed Mr.
Yaeger's attempted deduction as both abusive and directly contrary
to the Code.65 The potentially abusive nature of the claimed
56. 889 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1989).





62. Id. at 34.
63. Id.
64. Id. In fact, although courts strive to interpret "trade or business" in the same way
throughout the Code, the focus on number of trades indicates that they do not do so consistently
even across different types of trades or businesses. In the real estate area, for example, it is
possible for the courts to find a trade or business in the case of an isolated sale of a single piece of
real property. S&H, Inc. v. Comn'r, 78 T.C. 234, 245 (1982); see also Rentenbach & Sowell,
supra note 45, at 353-54.
65. While the court did not point to the amount of leverage Mr. Yaeger employed in order to
carry his investments as the reason for finding that he was an investor rather than a trader, there
was a strong undercurrent of suspicion in the opinion about his good faith in claiming a deduction
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deduction seems to have been compounded in the court's mind by
the imbalance between the ordinary character of his claimed
deductions and the (generally long-term) capital character of the
income he would ultimately earn. 66
In Adda v. Commissioner,67 the Tax Court considered whether
Mr. Adda, a nonresident alien individual, was engaged in a trade or
business in the United States by virtue of commodity futures
transactions that his brother entered into on his behalf. Mr. Adda had
authorized his brother, a resident of New York, to trade on U.S.
commodity exchanges on his behalf. 6
During 1941, Mr. Adda was cut off from his brokers and his
brother for at least some of the year. During that year, Mr. Adda had
net gains of $193,857.14 on the commodities transactions entered
into by his brother on his behalf. 69
The court stated that "[t]rading in commodities for one's own
account for profits may be a 'trade or business' if sufficiently
extensive."70 Mr. Adda's trading would have constituted a trade or
business had he been a U.S. resident during 1941, and the court
decided he should not escape such treatment solely by virtue of
for the interest expense. The court highlighted the legislative history of section 163(d) of the
Code, which disallows individual investors from taking a deduction for interest paid to carry
investments; this section was enacted to prevent investors from deferring capital gain income on
securities purchased with leverage while currently deducting the interest on that leverage. Yaeger,
889 F.2d at 32-33.
66. In 1979 and 1980, gain on the sale of an asset held for more than one year was
considered long-term capital gain. The top marginal tax rate was 70 percent for those years, while
the long-term capital gain exclusion for those years was 60 percent, meaning the effective rate on
long-term capital gain was 28 percent. Leonard Burman & Deborah Kobes, Preferential Capital
Gains Tax Rates, 102 TAX NOTES 411 (Jan. 19, 2004); see I.R.C. § 1202 (1980) ("If for any
taxable year a taxpayer other than a corporation has a net capital gain, 60 percent of the amount of
the net capital gain shall be a deduction from gross income."). This means that, if Mr. Yaeger had
been permitted to deduct his interest income at ordinary rates, he would have been able to reduce
his ordinary income by 70 percent of his interest expense, while any gain he realized in that same
period would have been taxed to him at 28 percent. Were the mark-to-market election available in
1979, permitting him to have made an ex post mark-to-market election would not have created
the same arbitrage opportunities. Rather, both his losses and gains would have been fully taken
into account each year at ordinary rates.
67. 10 T.C. 273 (1948). A foreign person or entity engaged in a trade or business in the
United States becomes subject to the U.S. federal income tax at ordinary tax rates. I.R.C.
§§ 871(b), 882(a) (2006). Before the enactment of section 864(b)(2), foreign persons investing in
U.S. securities had to worry about whether their trading activities caused them to be engaged in a
U.S. trade or business.
68. Adda, 10 T.C., at 274.
69. Id. at 275.
70. Id. at 277 (quoting Fuld v. Comm'r, 139 F.2d 465 (1943)).
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having transacted through his brother, whom the court considered the
equivalent of an agent resident of the United States. 71
On the other hand, the Tax Court found in Liang v.
Commissioner7" that Mr. Liang was not engaged in a U.S. trade or
business. Mr. Liang was also a nonresident alien individual who was
not present in the United States during the year in controversy. 13 Like
Mr. Adda, Mr. Liang authorized a U.S. resident to manage his
investments. "
The court held that Mr. Liang was not engaged in a U.S. trade or
business by virtue of the securities transactions his agent entered into
on his behalf. " Because the court was convinced that the primary
objective of Mr. Liang's investments was to provide him with a
reliable source of income, it determined that his agent's actions did
not cause him to be engaged in a trade or business. 76
Although courts have laid out a four-factor test to evaluate
whether a taxpayer is engaged in a trade or business, the test does not
fit well with a trader in securities and becomes a much more
complicated exercise. Courts look to some objectively determinable
factors, such as the number of trades made by a taxpayer, their
frequency throughout the year, and the source of the taxpayer's
gains.77 Courts also look to subjective factors, including the
taxpayer's objective in making those trades. 78 The test is generally
complicated and unclear even after the taxable year has ended and
71. Id. at278.
72. 23 T.C. 1040 (1955).
73. Id. at 1041.
74. Id. Unlike Mr. Adda, Mr. Liang paid his U.S. agent, although the court made no use of
this fact beyond its mere mention.
75. Id. at 1045.
76. Id. The court bolstered its conclusion that the activities of Mr. Liang's agent did not
cause Mr. Liang to be engaged in a U.S. trade or business by pointing out that, during four of the
seven years his agent acted on his behalf, capital transactions resulted in losses rather than gains,
and in another two, they resulted in insignificant gains. Id. However, this analysis, which focuses
on the results of an investor's transactions, seems ill suited to determining whether a person is a
trader or an investor, even using hindsight. That Mr. Liang's capital transactions resulted in a net
loss for more than half of the years the court examined may indicate that he intended to earn
money from dividends and long-term appreciation (i.e., as an investor). But it may equally well
demonstrate that he (through his agent) was an unsuccessful, unlucky, or untalented trader.
77. E.g., Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Liang, 23 T.C. at
1043.
78. E.g., Moller, 721 F.2d at 813.
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the facts are determinable. The test is unworkable as applied before
the taxable year has ended and the facts exist.
IV. TRADE OR BUSINESS FOR PURPOSES
OF THE MARK-TO-MARKET ELECTION
A handful of cases have attempted to apply the trader-in-
securities test discussed in Part III to a putative election under
section 475(f). 79 For example, Frank Chen, the plaintiff in the lead
case in this area, Chen v. Commissioner,8" had a full-time job and, in
addition, maintained two brokerage accounts. 8 In 1999, along with a
sizeable number of Americans, 2 he tried his hand at day-trading. 83
During that year, he initiated 323 transactions involving the purchase
or sale of securities. 84 Almost 94 percent of his transactions occurred
between February and April, and all of his day-trading occurred
between January and May, except for four trades that occurred in
July.85 Mr. Chen's skill as a day trader seems to have been
commensurate with that of many day traders who lost money in the
wake of the dot-com collapse: 86 he claimed a net loss of $84,794
from his trading for the year. 87
79. It is worth noting that in each of the section 475(f) cases, the taxpayer had attempted to
make a mark-to-market election after the date on which the election is required to be made. The
courts look separately at whether the taxpayer is a trader and at whether the taxpayer qualifies to
make the election late. Failing either prong causes the taxpayer to lose.
80. 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1388 (2004).
81. Id. at 1389.
82. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Capital Markets on the Internet, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y vii, ix (2001) ("Similarly, the ease of individual trading that the Internet facilitates has
sparked the explosive growth, in the late 1990s, of day traders .... "); Matt Krantz, Day Trading:
A Great Way to Lose It All, USA TODAY, Oct. 3, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfl/
columnist/krantz/2005-10-03-day-trade_x.htm ("Day trading got very popular during the late
1990s as many people saw the stock market soar to incredible heights in a short period of time.").
83. "Although day traders have historically been professional traders, the term 'day trader'
now often refers to nonprofessional securities traders whose patterns of securities trading are
different from those of ordinary investors." Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders
and the Ideology of Fair and Orderly Markets, 26 J. CORP. L. 63, 63 (2000).
84. Chen, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1388.
85. Id.
86. Miller, supra note 82, at ix ("Mr. Myers's observation that things change at light speed
in the industry is borne out by the equally rapid fall off in day trading in the wake of the bursting
of the dot-com and tech-stock bubbles."); Krantz, supra note 82 ("And during [the late 1990s],
many investors did profit handsomely. But many of these same investors were subsequently
destroyed when the vicious bear market ravaged the Nasdaq, Internet stocks and then the broad
market.").
87. Chen, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1388.
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Mr. Chen did not attempt to make a mark-to-market election
until 2003, when he purported to make an election under section
475(f), effective retroactively to January 1, 1999.88 In determining
whether he was eligible to make the election, the court initially
ignored the question of whether he qualified to make a retroactive
election and instead analyzed whether he was a trader or an investor
using principles from the trader-or-investor line of cases. The Tax
Court stated that, in order for Mr. Chen to be a trader, his purchase
and sale of securities had to qualify as a trade or business. 89 The
court looked to two factors: the volume of his trading and the
regularity with which he engaged in the purchase and sale of
securities. 90
The court acknowledged that Mr. Chen made daily trades during
February, March, and April but also recognized that he made no
trades during six months of 1999.91 And in the remaining three
months, he made only twenty of his more than three hundred trades
for the year. 92 The court determined that daily trading for a quarter of
the year, with infrequent or no trading during the rest of the year,
was not "frequent, regular, and continuous" 93 trading and did not
meet either factor necessary to establish that he had engaged in the
trade or business of trading securities. The court further pointed to
the fact that his job, rather than his day-trading, was Mr. Chen's
primary remunerative activity. " Therefore, the court held, Mr. Chen
88. While it is not clear why Mr. Chen waited over three years to make the election, it
became clear as of the close of 1999 that the election was in his best interest. Absent the election,
he had a capital loss of $84,794, deductible only if and to the extent that it exceeded 2 percent of
his adjusted gross income, I.R.C. § 67 (2006), and deductible only against capital gain plus
$3,000 of ordinary income. Id. §§ 165(f), 1211 (b) (2006). With the election in place, however, his
full loss would be ordinary in character, deductible in full against any income, including wage
income. Id. § 475(f)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
89. Chen, 87 T.C.M. at 1389.
90. Id. at 1390.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1388 (quoting Boatner v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 342, 345 (1997)).
94. The emphasis the court placed on the fact that Mr. Chen's primary source of income was
his work as an engineer in explaining why his trading activities did not constitute a trade or
business seems odd, at best, and exemplifies the confusion inherent in requiring that a taxpayer be
a trader in order to make a mark-to-market election. Although it is relatively clear that Mr. Chen's
attempt to retroactively elect to be taxed on a mark-to-market basis was an attempt to profit from
his ex post knowledge in a manner and time inconsistent with the Code and the Treasury
regulations and, thus, the court was correct to deny his claim, the court was clearly wrong that
engaging in one trade or business precludes a taxpayer from engaging in any other. The Code,
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was not engaged in the trade or business of trading securities, which
meant that he was an investor, not a trader, and that the mark-to-
market election under section 475(f) was unavailable to him.
Because it determined that he could not, in any event, make the
election, the court declined to address his contention that he should
have been permitted to make the election late.
In Acar v. United States,95 the court also dealt with a taxpayer's
attempt to make a late section 475(t) election. Plaintiff Kazim Z.
Acar alleged that he was a professional in the financial services
industry and a securities trader. 96 In 1999, he sustained a net loss
from his trading activities, which he initially claimed as a capital loss
on his 1999 return. 9 7 In 2002, he filed an amended return, in which
he purported to elect to mark his securities gains and losses to market
under section 475(f), causing his trading losses to be ordinary rather
than capital and claiming a refund of $46,396.98
Mr. Acar claimed that he met the standards enunciated in Chen
to be treated as a trader: he testified that he devoted six to eight hours
a day to trading activities nearly every day and that the number of
trades he made in 1999 averaged nearly two trades a day.99 The
government countered that, although his trades may have averaged
two a day, he actually made trades on less than half of the days in
each month and that he did not trade at all between June and
August. 10 The government further argued that Mr. Acar's primary
regulations, and case law are all clear that a person may engage in multiple trades or businesses in
various contexts. I.R.C. § 446(d) (2006) ("A taxpayer engaged in more than one trade or business
may, in computing taxable income, use a different method of accounting for each trade or
business."); Phila. Quartz Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 512, 515 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Surely
taxpayers can be in multiple trades or businesses .... "); Treas. Reg. § 1. 1446-3(e)(4) ex. 1 (2005)
("B is engaged in multiple trades or businesses (including the PRS partnership) that give rise to
effectively connected income."); accord Schwartz, supra note 45, at 439 ("It is beyond
dispute... that a taxpayer can be engaged in more than one trade or business."). The court seems
to have found the fact that securities trading was not Mr. Chen's primary source of income
helpful in bolstering its holding, however, and in the interest of preventing Mr. Chen from taking
advantage of his hindsight knowledge, created precedent making it even more difficult for a
taxpayer to know ex ante whether she qualifies as a trader.
95. No. C 06-0344 PJH, 2006 WL 2374636 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006).
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id. at*1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *2.
100. Id.
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source of income in 1999 and throughout subsequent years was his
life insurance and mutual fund sales business. 101
In contrast to the Chen court, the district court in this case
determined that, although Mr. Acar's statements on his tax return
suggested that he was not a trader, he had proven the existence of a
material disputed fact, which would have been sufficient to survive
the government's motion for summary judgment. 102 He had not,
however, made a timely election. "' The court determined that Mr.
Acar had not met the regulatory requirements to make a late
election. "0 The court, therefore, dismissed Mr. Acar's case.
Both courts clearly came to the correct conclusion. The
taxpayers were acting with hindsight, knowing that they had a loss
rather than a gain before attempting to make the election.
Admittedly, the taxpayers faced potential ordinary rather than capital
gains in the future from trading activities: the section 475(f) election
is irrevocable without permission from the secretary of the Treasury
Department. 105 However, they knew that they had a loss for the first
year. If they were concerned about future gains being ordinary rather
than capital, the plaintiffs in the cases could-by ceasing to invest
and divesting their portfolios or by reworking their portfolios to
include solely bonds and other investments on which gains are
treated as ordinary by default "06 -ensure that they would never have
an offsetting gain that was, by virtue of their section 475(f) election,
recharacterized as ordinary. Moreover, as a consequence of the time
101. Id.
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *5. The court found not only that Mr. Acar had failed to demonstrate that he had
acted in good faith but that his motivation seemed "the classic definition of 'hindsight."' Id.
Although trader-or-investor analysis was not determinative of the outcome of Acar, in deciding
that Mr. Acar would have survived the motion for summary judgment on that point, the district
court used the same analysis that the Tax Court had used in Chen. There is no reason to believe
that, had the case gone to trial, the court would not have analyzed the investor-or-trader issue in
exactly the same way.
105. I.R.C. § 475(0(3) (2006).
106. Interest income is ordinary. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965)
("[Sitated interest [is] concededly ordinary income and not a capital asset .... "). Returns on debt
tend to be less risky, so a portfolio that included only debt would tend to provide lower returns for
the investor, and its lack of diversification would make the portfolio dangerously susceptible to
adverse movements in interest rates and other credit risks. But, although a debt-only portfolio
would appear to be undesirable, it would nonetheless allow the investor to avoid any downside to
a section 475(0 election after she realized a benefit in the first year.
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value of money, the present value of a current deduction outweighs
the present value of an equivalent future inclusion in income. 107
V. WHY THE JUDICIAL TRADE-OR-BUSINESS
CRITERIA Do NOT WORK
In spite of the uncertainty relating to whether a taxpayer is
deemed a trader or an investor, the facts-and-circumstances analysis
developed by the courts and adopted by the IRS ultimately works for
purposes of determining both whether investment expenses are
miscellaneous itemized deductions and whether a non-U.S. person is
engaged in a trade or business in the United States. In both cases, a
person determines ex post whether her investment activities
constituted a trade or business. Individuals are not required to file
their tax returns until April 15, 108 and corporations not until March
15, 09 of the following year. This means that after the relevant year is
over, individuals have three and one-half months in order to
determine whether, in the prior year, their investment activities
constituted a trade or business.
In spite of the fact that for most purposes a person can determine
whether she is a trader or an investor after the tax year ends,
Congress recognized in the international area that the law "was
chaotic, with the line between trading as a business and trading as an
investment being drawn case by case according to the frequency of
trades and the average length of holdings." "' As a result, Congress
amended the Code to provide that trading in stocks, securities, and
commodities would not constitute a trade or business in the United
States. '
107. Schizer, supra note 3, at 1909 ("By keeping appreciated investments, [taxpayers] can
defer gains (thereby reducing the present value of the tax). By selling depreciated property, they
can accelerate losses (thereby preserving the present value of deductions).").
108. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (2006).
109. I.R.C. § 6072(b). Furthermore, as a matter of course, most taxpayers can get an
automatic six-month extension in which to file their tax returns. Treas. Reg. § 1.6081-3(a) (2008)
(for corporations); id. § 1.6081-4T(a) (for individuals).
110. Joseph Isenbergh, The "Trade or Business" of Foreign Taxpayers in the United States,
61 TAXES 972, 981 (1983).
111. I.R.C. § 864(b)(2) (2006); see H.R. REP. No. 89-1450, at 13 (1966) ('[Y]our committee
has amended present law to specifically provide that, except in the case of a dealer, the trading in
stocks, securities, or commodities in the United States, for one's own account, whether by a
foreign person physically present in the United States, through an employee located here, or
through a resident broker, commission agent, custodian, or other agent-whether or not that agent
has discretionary authority-does not constitute a trade or business in the United States.").
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Beyond being merely chaotic, however, the courts' investor-or-
trader analysis is useless to taxpayers who want to make a timely
election. The courts adopted the trade-or-business analysis used in
section 162 deduction cases, focusing especially on frequency and
consistency of trading. Factors such as frequency of trading and
whether trading occurred to capture gains based on short-term
swings in the market work fine for purposes of determining whether
a loss is fully deductible or whether a taxpayer who makes a late
election was an investor in a prior year. 112 A taxpayer does not file
her return until April of the following year, 113 which means that, by
the time she has to determine whether her investment losses are
miscellaneous itemized deductions or are fully deductible, she knows
how frequently and consistently she participated in trading activities.
Furthermore, for most purposes in the Code, it is possible to be a
trader in some years and an investor in others.
It makes sense, of course, that courts would develop an ex post
test. Courts do not have jurisdiction until there is a case or
controversy. 14 In the case of a tax controversy, in order for
jurisdiction to vest in a federal district court or the Court of Federal
Claims, a taxpayer must have paid the full tax assessed (albeit under
protest) and then sued for a refund, 15 while for a case to be heard in
the Tax Court, the taxpayer must have received a deficiency
notice. "16 In any federal income tax case that comes before the
112. They arguably should not have been relevant in the late election cases, however. The
courts could have focused solely on whether the taxpayer was eligible to make a late election. The
Treasury regulations require that, in order to make a late election, a taxpayer must request an
extension of time from the Treasury Department and, in order to be granted the extension of time,
must establish that she acted reasonably and in good faith and that the extension will not
prejudice the interests of the government. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3(a) (1967). The Acar court
found that Mr. Acar had not met the requirements, and the Chen court arguably could have come
to the same conclusion. In that sense, it is unfortunate that the Chen court chose to base its
outcome on the investor-or-trader distinction because, given that this is the lead case in the area, it
is likely that future courts will continue to address the trader-or-investor distinction, even if they
ultimately base their decision on the qualification to make a late election.
113. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (2006).
114. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2; see also Sterner v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 467 F.
Supp. 2d 1017, 1025 (S.D. Cal. 2006) ("A federal court's judicial power is limited to 'cases' or
'controversies."').
115. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960) ("Reargument has but fortified our view
that § 134 6(a)(1), correctly construed, requires full payment of the assessment before an income
tax refund suit can be maintained in a Federal District Court.").
116. I.R.C. § 6213(a) (2006).
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courts, then, the relevant facts are in the past, and the court is in a
position to analyze the facts and circumstances. 117
Deciding whether to make the mark-to-market election is not,
however, amenable to an ex post facts-and-circumstances test. As
mentioned above, individuals and existing entities that decide to
mark their trading gains and losses to market must make the election
no later than the date on which their tax return is due (ignoring any
extensions requested or granted) for the year prior to the year for
which the election will be effective. ' For a new taxpayer, the
election must be made by March 15 if she uses the calendar year to
calculate her tax liability. "9 In other words, a taxpayer must make
the election before there are any facts or circumstances with respect
to her trading activities. Making the election is a quintessentially ex
ante decision.
Furthermore, the election is perpetual, unless revoked with the
consent of the secretary of the Treasury Department. 120 When the
requirements are taken at face value, then, a taxpayer must not only
know whether she will be engaged in the trade or business of trading
securities for the current year ,2' but also know whether she will be so
engaged in two years, in five, in ten, and so on. The Code does not
provide any guidance for the electing trader who ceases to be a
trader, either accidentally or because she altered her investment
strategy. Moreover, it would be unfair to force her to choose between
keeping an investment strategy she no longer wants in order to
remain eligible for the mark-to-market election or to change her
investment strategy and possibly lose her election. 12 Because the
117. Even in those cases where a court looks to the taxpayer's state of mind at the time she
entered into the transaction, everything relevant to the transaction has occurred. That is, even
when a court analyzes a taxpayer's intentions, the court can do so only when it knows how the
transaction turned out.
118. Rev. Proc. 99-17, 1999-7 I.R.B. § 5.03(1).
119. Id. at § 5.03(2).
120. I.R.C. § 475(t)(3) (2008).
121. As discussed supra, although the election is ex ante, it is technically made within two
and one-half to three and one-half months of the beginning of the year to which it will apply.
When she makes the election, therefore, our putative trader will have knowledge of where the
market, and more importantly her investments, went over the course of roughly the first quarter.
However, assuming that investments in securities are truly risky, their performance over the first
three months of the year in no way presages whether she will end her year with a net gain or a net
loss.
Winter 2010]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 43:507
result of changing her investment strategy is so unclear, the decision
becomes even more costly to her. 123
In general, it makes economic sense for somebody who invests
for the short term (i.e., who holds a majority of her investments for
one year or less) to elect mark-to-market treatment. 124 Short-term
capital gains are taxed at ordinary rates, 125 but short-term capital
losses are deductible only to the extent of the capital gains plus
$3,000. 126 A mark-to-market election would be a win-win situation
for a trader, then. Her gains would be taxed at the same rate, while
her losses would be fully deductible. Furthermore, a trader with a
significant quantity of investments would not be required to keep
track of the basis of each security she owns. 127
Although the courts established the criteria used to determine
whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of trading
securities, even assuming judges recognized the need to craft the rule
into a form that would work for section 475(f), they are not in a
position to clarify the standards a taxpayer must meet in order to
qualify to elect mark-to-market accounting, for a number of reasons.
Principal among these reasons is the fact that courts can hear only
122. The markets can turn on a dime, necessitating sometimes a change in investment
strategy. For the first six months of 2006, for example, the economy seemed to be growing
comfortably, and the word subprime was virtually unknown. However, at the end of 2006, the
first subprime lenders began to fail, and even as subprime lenders announced that any blowback
was an overreaction, the failures built up steam until, by July and August of 2007, "this slowly
building wave became a tsunami in the global financial markets." Nelson D. Schwartz & Vikas
Bajaj, How Missed Signs Contributed to a Mortgage Meltdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at
Al. It would be unfair and unreasonable to require an electing trader to stand by her strategy in
light of a sea change of this magnitude, solely to maintain her qualification to meet the election
she already made, especially where it is unclear what happens if she fails to qualify after making
the election.
123. Because it is unclear what the answer is, our trader or investor would likely, at bare
minimum, have to pay tax attorneys or accountants to try to determine the correct answer, and
because there currently appears to be no ascertainable correct answer, even then she would not be
likely to receive significant comfort.
124. Schwartz, supra note 45, at 426. Schwartz notes that one exception to this general rule is
where a taxpayer has a capital loss carryover. Id. at 426 n. 172.
125. Short-term capital gains are not included in the definition of "net capital gain," I.R.C.
§ 1222(11) (2006), and are therefore not eligible for the preferential capital gain tax rates. Id.
§ l(h)(1) (2006).
126. Id. §§ 165(f), 1211(b)(1) (2006).
127. Schwartz believes that the IRS's position is that, in order to be a trader, a taxpayer must
be buying and selling securities on the same day, which would at least partially ameliorate the
record-keeping burden. Schwartz, supra note 45, at 431. However, he believes that such a strict
requirement is not supported by case law and that a trader should be able to hold securities for
longer than a day. Id. at 431-32.
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cases and controversies. 128 At the time the taxpayer must make the
election, however, there is no controversy. The controversy only
arises when the IRS disallows the election, and it appears that the
IRS currently disallows elections principally, if not exclusively,
when a taxpayer attempts to make a late election. 129 Unless and until
the IRS challenges a timely election, then, the question of what
constitutes trader status will not be addressed by the courts.
Moreover, even if such a case did arise, and even assuming that
the judge was sympathetic to the taxpayer's dilemma, it is unclear
that, in light of the doctrine of stare decisis, the judge would have
any leeway in interpreting section 475(f). Courts interpret the phrase
"trade or business" consistently across the Code. 130 There is no
ambiguity to resolve, and the standard for being engaged in a trade or
business is well established, '1 if unhelpful in this situation. Any
solution, then, would have to be enacted by Congress through an
amendment of the Code, or by the Treasury Department through the
promulgation of regulations.
VI. A NEW REGIME FOR MARK-TO-MARKET ELECTIONS
A. Eliminating the Mismatch
As this Article has demonstrated, requiring a taxpayer to be
engaged in the trade or business of trading securities as a prerequisite
for making a mark-to-market election does not work. An ex post test
and an ex ante election are a poor match. In light of the virtual
impossibility of reconciling the two, it would behoove Congress to
128. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.
129. E.g., Acar v. United States, No. C 06-0344 PJH, 2006 WL 2374636 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
2006); Chen v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1388 (2004).
130. Piedad Alvarado deKrause v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1362 (1974) ("The words
'trade or business' are terminology familiar to the tax law that should be interpreted consistently
with the general body of law on this subject."). It is not explicit in the Code, in the Treasury
regulations, or in the congressional reports that a trader in securities is equivalent to a person who
engages in the trade or business of trading in securities. Schwartz, supra note 45, at 426-27.
However, the Joint Committee on Taxation's General Explanation clarified that equivalence. Id.
at 428 (citing 1997 BLUE BOOK, at 180). Although the General Explanation is not law, it is
probably an accurate description of Congress's intent. In any event, the courts have adopted the
requirement that, in order to elect mark-to-market treatment, a trader in securities must be
engaged in the trade or business of trading securities, see supra Part IV, so that requirement is
effectively part of the tax law.
131. See generally Lopez, supra note 44 (surveying the use of the trade-or-business
distinction in a broad cross section of cases).
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set the mark-to-market election free of the doctrinal constraints of a
trade or business, like it freed non-U.S. investors from the trade-or-
business constraints more than forty years ago, especially in light of
the fact that the mark-to-market election better reflects Haig-Simons
income.
Congress did not explain why it chose to limit the election to
traders, 32 which leaves only conjecture about why it imposed the
limit. Presumably it was (a) because of discomfort with
nonrealization accounting (i.e., for historical reasons); (b) in order to
protect taxpayers from being subject to taxes they could not afford to
pay (i.e., for paternalistic reasons); or (c) because Congress was
worried that, at the margins, there would be tax arbitrage available if
investors were permitted to mark their securities and commodities
investments to market (i.e., for strategic reasons). None of these,
however, is a compelling reason to prevent non-traders from being
able to elect to use mark-to-market accounting.
Since the inception of the income tax, realization accounting has
underlain the responsibility to pay taxes on gains and other
income. "' Although it does not reflect Haig-Simons income, a
realization system has one distinct advantage: when a taxpayer is
taxed only after she disposes of an appreciated asset, she has liquid
assets with which to pay her tax bill. 134 Having the liquid assets
necessary to pay the tax bill promotes both fairness and compliance:
compliance because the taxpayer is more likely to pay when she has
cash on hand, and fairness because she is capable of paying her tax
liability.
Nonetheless, realization accounting is a second-best solution.
Rather than promoting and protecting it, Congress should encourage
taxpayers, where possible, to report and pay taxes on their true
economic income, rather than on only the income that they have
realized. Even though the Code has historically preferred realization
accounting, 135 history should not be a primary consideration in
formulating tax policy.
The paternalism justification is slightly more persuasive:
because an electing taxpayer must pay taxes each year on the
132. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
133. See Potter, supra note 3, at 879; Weisbach, supra note 3, at 96.
134. See Brunson, supra note 16, at 28.
135. See Schenk, supra note 3, at 375.
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increase in the net asset value of her investments-and because, once
made, the election cannot be easily revoked-Congress perhaps
intended to protect taxpayers from themselves. 136 Under this
formulation, trader status may represent a proxy for financial savvy.
That is, while anybody can invest, it takes a base level of
engagement to be a trader, and presumably, a trader has enough
economic knowledge to understand the consequences of mark-to-
market accounting.
Nonetheless, mark-to-market accounting better reflects true
income and should be available to those who want it. Although trader
status may be useful as a proxy for economic understanding, it is not
by any means the only possible proxy. Because the election is opt-in
rather than opt-out, 137 it requires a certain baseline understanding of
taxes, and presumably, any taxpayer who has expended the effort to
understand that the section 475(f) election exists, how the election
works, and how to make the election has a sufficient knowledge base
to be allowed to make the election if she determines it is in her best
interest. There is nothing inherent about engaging in a trade or
business that causes a taxpayer to understand the implications of
paying taxes on Haig-Simons income. Likewise, there is nothing
inherent in not trading sufficiently to be considered engaged in a
trade or business that would prevent a taxpayer from understanding
the election. The act of making the election seems to be as good a
proxy for the taxpayer's understanding of what she is getting herself
into as is being a trader.
Finally, there is the potential for tax arbitrage. Mark-to-market
accounting, however, is difficult to arbitrage. As Professor David M.
Schizer explains, mark-to-market accounting eliminates the timing
136. Miller, supra note 3, at 1053.
137. This relates to the idea of "libertarian paternalism" (i.e., that we can design choices in
such a way as to encourage people to make the more socially responsible choice, while still
allowing them to choose). Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Better Choices, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A21. Libertarian paternalism posits, in part, that if we want people to act
in a particular way, we make that the default option and allow them to opt out if they so choose.
Id. ("If we want to increase savings by workers, we could ask employers to adopt this simple
strategy: Instead of asking workers to elect to participate in a 401(k) plan, assume they want to
participate and enroll them automatically unless they specifically choose otherwise."). Here,
however, by making realization accounting the default, the Code does not encourage taxpayers to
choose mark-to-market accounting. Instead, by requiring a taxpayer to opt in to mark-to-market
accounting, it makes sure that only people who are motivated (and, presumably, understand that
they may be required to pay taxes even if they do not have liquid assets) are subject to the regime.
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option. 13 Instead, it treats all unrealized gains and losses as realized
on the last day of each taxable year. 139 In addition, mark-to-market
accounting eliminates differences in character, treating all gains and
losses as ordinary. 140 Because it eliminates the timing option, mark-
to-market accounting moots several anti-arbitrage provisions in the
Code. Section 263, for example, disallows any deduction for interest
and other carrying charges allocable to straddles, but the proposed
Treasury regulations provide that the section does not apply to
securities that are marked to market. 141 Likewise, mark-to-market
accounting eliminates the deferral opportunities of investing in
offshore companies. In recognition of this, the punitive passive
foreign investment company rules do not apply to securities subject
to mark-to-market accounting. 142
In fact, the only attempted tax arbitrage stemming from the
section 475(f) regime currently in place is the attempt by certain
traders, after they know that they incurred a net loss during a year, to
make a late election. 143 Taxpayers who have tried to take advantage
of their hindsight have been famously unsuccessful in convincing the
courts to allow a late election. 144 Moreover, if Congress is concerned
about this possibility, it can prohibit late elections. Tax arbitrage,
then, should not be an issue.
In addition, an elective tax regime, while beneficial to certain
taxpayers, arguably contravenes certain basic tax policy
considerations by, for example, adding complexity to the Code and
violating horizontal equity without necessarily creating any benefit
138. Schizer, Balance, supra note 3, at 1918.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 1894.
141. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(g)-l(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 4746, 4749 (Jan. 8, 2001). A "straddle"
consists of two offsetting positions in a security (e.g., a long position and a short position in the
same security). I.R.C. § 1092(c) (2006). Because the positions are offsetting, when one increases
in value, the other decreases. Prior to the enactment of the straddle rules, a taxpayer could sell off
the position that decreased in value, recognizing the loss. At the same time, she would continue to
own the gain position, deferring recognition of the gain. See, e.g., John P. Bransfield, Proposal to
Change the Federal Income Taxation of Marketable Securities, 2 HoUS. Bus. & TAX L.J. 328,
339-41 (2002). If the gain and loss on both positions were recognized every year, however, a
taxpayer could not defer recognition of the gain and the arbitrage opportunity would disappear.
Id. at 340-41.
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.1291-1(c)(4)(i) (as amended in 2004).
143. See supra notes 79-107.
144. E.g., Chen v. Comm'r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1388 (2004); Acar v. United States, No. C 06-
0344 PJH, 2006 WL 2374636 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006).
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for the government. 145 In spite of violating certain tax policy norms,
however, elective mark-to-market accounting makes it easier to tax
Haig-Simons income, even taking into account the practical
advantages of a realization system. The benefits of a more
theoretically sound system of tax should outweigh any detriments
introduced by making mark-to-market accounting elective.
The trader requirement should be removed from section 475(f)
because mark-to-market accounting reflects a taxpayer's income
better than traditional realization accounting and eliminates several
arbitrage opportunities that a taxpayer might otherwise have.
Currently, there is no compelling reason to limit the availability of
the election to traders in securities and commodities, and more
importantly, there is vast uncertainty at the time the election must be
made about whether a taxpayer qualifies to make the election (and
about whether she will qualify in the future). Any taxpayer who so
desires should be permitted to elect to mark her securities and
commodities investments to market. Although administrative
difficulties preclude the full implementation of mark-to-market
accounting, expanding the availability of the mark-to-market election
to all investors would promote fairness and certainty in the Code and
would bring the Code closer to taxing Haig-Simons income to the
extent it is administratively feasible.
B. The Safe Harbor
Alternatively, if Congress were to determine that continuing to
limit the availability of the mark-to-market election was preferable to
making the election available to all taxpayers, it would nonetheless
be critical to clarify the prerequisites a taxpayer must meet in order
to elect taxation on a mark-to-market basis. Although there are
undoubtedly many possible and viable ways to clarify the currently
ambiguous requirements that must be met in order for a trader to
elect to mark her investments in securities or commodities to market,
the remainder of this section in the Article will propose a new
145. E.g., Bradley T. Borden, Policy and Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax
Partnerships, 56 KAN. L. REV. 317, 367 (2008) ("Tax policy does not support elective tax
treatment."); see also Start Making Sense, http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2007/11/fred-
thompsons-bad-idea.html (Nov. 29, 2007) ("Taxpayer elections are almost always a bad idea.
They add complexity while losing revenue, since taxpayers have an incentive to look at all the
options and then pick the one under which they pay the least. Plus, the pattern of tax liability you
get is bound to be incorrect, given its being a mix-and-match between different systems.").
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qualification regime for making a mark-to-market election an ex ante
safe harbor. In addition, this section discusses two ways in which the
safe harbor could be enacted. The first, an administrative solution, is
simpler and is likely an easier route, provided the Treasury
Department has authority to issue the regulations necessary to
implement the safe harbor. The second, a legislative solution,
clarifies the requirements but requires congressional action, which
may be difficult to achieve practically. Although eliminating the
trader requirement is a better solution than providing a safe harbor,
even the safe harbor would significantly clarify the requirements and
make it possible and more practical for taxpayers to evaluate whether
they qualify to make the election.
Under the proposed safe harbor, if a taxpayer reasonably
believes that she will make at least three hundred trades a year (or
roughly six trades a week), she will be eligible to make the mark-to-
market election, whether or not it turns out that she was engaged in
the trade or business of trading securities. Furthermore, in order to
capture the courts' concept that trading should be frequent and
continuous, any such safe harbor could require that, in order to be
eligible to make the section 475(f) election, a taxpayer must
reasonably expect to make at least twelve trades every month. By
requiring a taxpayer to reasonably expect to make a set number of
monthly and yearly trades, the Treasury Department would eliminate
the day trader who expects to be excited for three months and make
frequent, if not daily, trades but does not expect to be continuously
trading throughout the whole year. If the test is subjective-that is, if
a taxpayer must reasonably believe she will make sufficient trades
over the course of every year-then it is not essential that she
actually make a specific number of trades. 46
It is important that the election be made truly ex ante. It would
be theoretically ideal if the deadline to make an election were the day
146. That said, making a sufficient number of trades would not be immaterial. If the taxpayer
made, for example, three sales in each of her first three years, the IRS could reasonably argue
that, absent some compelling explanation, her prospective belief was unreasonable. The line
would necessarily not be bright. But part of the problem with the currently applied trade-or-
business standard is that the number and frequency of trades necessary to meet the requirement
are not clear, and even if it were clear that three hundred trades in a year met the standard, a
taxpayer would not know in advance (i.e., when she had to make the election) whether she would
meet the standard. But somebody who clearly intends to invest for long-term capital appreciation
would be unlikely to qualify for such a safe harbor.
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prior to the first day of the taxable year for which it would take effect
(usually December 31 for individual taxpayers, whereas corporations
and other entities may have noncalendar taxable years). But on a
practical level, the current requirement-the due date of the electing
taxpayer's tax return (without extensions) for the taxable year prior
to the year in which the election will take effect-is preferable.
Requiring the election to be made before the taxable year begins
would cause taxpayers to be entirely indifferent to whether they were
taxed at ordinary or capital gains rates, because they would not have
any idea how the year would end. ' Because the return on financial
instruments that can be marked to market is largely risk based, '48 a
taxpayer cannot know on April 15 based on just the first quarter's
performance where the market will be at the end of the year. This
creates very few, if any, arbitrage possibilities, because it offers
taxpayers very little additional certainty. Requiring the election to be
made prior to the beginning of the taxable year to which it applies
would add a certain amount of complexity to the Code, requiring
taxpayers to learn the existence of a new filing date and, potentially,
requiring the IRS to create a new form with a new filing deadline. It
is simpler to allow taxpayers to make their election on a date when
they are already accustomed to dealing with the IRS.
Such a safe harbor would not require a significant learning curve
for the IRS to implement and administer. There are already safe
harbors in place that rely on taxpayers' subjective intent. For
example, the IRS recently provided a safe harbor under section
704(c), which was enacted by Congress in order to prevent taxpayers
from taking advantage of the partnership form to shift tax
consequences between partners. 149 Under section 704(c), income,
147. See supra notes 27-28.
148. See supra note 26.
149. Rev. Proc. 2007-59, 2007-2 C.B. 745. Absent section 704(c), a taxpayer who held IBM
stock with a $50 basis and a fair market value of $100 could--provided she met certain
requirements--contribute her stock to a partnership in return for a partnership interest worth $100
in a tax-free exchange. See I.R.C. § 721 (2006). At that point, the partner could sell her
partnership interest for $100 and recognize no gain on the sale, I.R.C. § 1001(a) (2006),
effectively cashing out her IBM stock free of tax. In the alternative, she could remain a partner,
and when the partnership sold the stock, she would be allocated only a portion of the gain (e.g., if
the partnership had four equal partners and the partnership sold the stock for $100, she would be
allocated one-fourth of the $50 gain, or $12.50, as opposed to the $50 she would have realized
had she sold the shares herself). Why would other partners be willing to accommodate her? If, for
example, the other partners were tax-exempt or otherwise not subject to U.S. federal income tax,
or if the other partners had net operating losses that would otherwise expire unused, they would
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gains, losses, and deductions related to contributed property are to be
allocated among partners in a manner that takes into account the
difference between the contributing partner's basis in the property
and the property's fair market value at the time of the contribution. 150
Furthermore, if the property is distributed to someone other than the
contributing partner within seven years of its contribution, the
contributing partner must recognize any gains or losses she would
have recognized had the partnership instead sold the property at its
fair market value. 151
These special allocations that take precontribution gains into
account are generally made on a property-by-property basis, and
built-in gains and losses from different items of contributed property
cannot generally be aggregated. 152 The Treasury regulations permit
securities partnerships to aggregate built-in gains and losses. 15' The
IRS created a safe harbor allowing any partnership that meets the
requirements to aggregate its built-in gains and losses. 154 In order to
qualify for this safe harbor, among other things, a partnership must
reasonably expect[], as of the first day of each taxable year
for which the partnership seeks to aggregate under this
revenue procedure, that the partnership . . . will make at
least 200 trades of qualified financial assets during the
taxable year, the aggregate value of which will comprise at
least 50% of the book value of the partnership's assets...
as of the first day of the taxable year. 155
Provided the partnership has a reasonable ex ante belief that it
will make two hundred trades comprising half of its net value, then
the partnership is eligible to aggregate its built-in gains and losses.
As with a trader in securities and commodities, the partnership
cannot know at the beginning of the year whether it will make the
specific number of trades. It is, however, in a position to know that it
be indifferent to the gain, and (for a price, at least) may be willing to accommodate the taxpayer's
desire.
150. I.R.C. § 704(c)(1)(A) (2006).
151. Id. § 704(c)(1)(B).
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(2) (as amended in 2005).
153. Id. § 1.704-3(e)(3).
154. Rev. Proc. 2007-59, 2007-2 C.B. 745.
155. Id. § 3.01 (emphasis added).
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necessarily intends to make an average of about four trades a week
for the following year.
Providing the safe harbor will allow taxpayers certainty that
when they make a mark-to-market election, they are eligible to make
the election. This certainty will also reduce the disruptive effects of
the Code. By knowing in advance that she qualifies to make the
election, a taxpayer who desires to be taxed on a mark-to-market
basis will not have to settle for realization accounting because she is
uncertain whether she will qualify.
C. Enactment of the Safe Harbor
Through Regulatory Means
In many respects, it would be simplest for the safe harbor to be
enacted through regulations. The Treasury Department can act
without requiring bipartisan agreement and the political give-and-
take inherent in the legislative process. There are, however, at least
three potentially significant problems with the Treasury's issuance of
safe-harbor regulations allowing a taxpayer to make the election. The
first is the question of whether the Treasury Department has the
authority to make such regulations, potentially bypassing the
legislative and judicial definitions of "trade or business." Second,
taxpayers could attempt to use the safe harbor to be treated as traders
in situations to which the safe harbor was not intended to apply.
Third, although the safe harbor would provide certainty to taxpayers
who meet its criteria, there would still be taxpayers who do not
qualify for the safe harbor and have to use the unworkable facts-and-
circumstances test in order to determine whether they are eligible to
elect mark-to-market accounting.
Regulations under section 475(f) could be either legislative or
interpretative, depending on the provenance of the Treasury
Department's authority to promulgate them. 156 The secretary of the
Treasury Department has general interpretative authority to
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of"
the Code. 157 Furthermore, the secretary is granted express legislative
authority to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or
156. See Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. United States, 798 F. Supp. 505, 510 (C.D. I11. 1992)
(discussing whether a particular regulation "is a legislative or interpretative regulation"), revd,
37 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994).
157. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).
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appropriate to carry out the purposes of [section 475]." 158 On the face
of the statute, the requirements a taxpayer must meet in order to be
permitted to make a mark-to-market election fit squarely within these
legislative regulatory mandates. Not only would the standards to be
prescribed seem to be needful under the more general grant of
regulatory authority, but they would appear to be necessary to carry
out the legislative purpose of permitting a mark-to-market election.
In general, courts will defer to the Treasury Department's
authority to promulgate regulations, especially when the regulations
are legislative. 159 However, the Treasury Department's regulatory
authority does not permit it to make regulations that contradict the
statute or judicial decisions. 160 The Treasury Department cannot
contradict by regulation the unambiguous language of the Code. 161
And, although this Article has argued that the standard that
determines whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or business of
trading securities are unclear and unworkable when applied prior to
the beginning of a taxable year (and for that matter are unworkable
when applied earlier than the close of the taxable year), Congress
created, and the courts approved and explicated, this standard, which
is that, in order to make a mark-to-market election under section
475(f), a person must be a trader in securities or commodities and, in
order to be treated as a trader, that same person must be engaged in
the trade or business of trading securities or commodities. 162 It is not
clear that a person who would meet the criteria of the regulatory
regime proposed by this Article--or, for that matter, any other ex
ante regime the Treasury Department could promulgate-would
always qualify as a trader in securities or commodities. Although the
IRS created a similar safe harbor so that a partnership may aggregate
158. I.R.C. § 475(g) (2006).
159. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 798 F. Supp. at 511 (applying a "general deferential
standard... in assessing the validity of a regulation"). Cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 596 (1983) ("(Elver since the inception of the Tax Code, Congress has seen fit to vest
in those administering the tax laws very broad authority to interpret those laws.").
160. CWT Farms v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 1054, 1062 (1980), affd, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir.
1985).
161. Gehl Co. v. Comm'r, 795 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Where the term that the
regulation purports to interpret has already been specifically defined by Congress, the
Commissioner's authority to promulgate the regulation is relatively more circumscribed than if
the term used is a general one that was not further defined by Congress." (citing United States v.
Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982)).
162. I.R.C. § 475(0.
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its built-in gains and losses, such aggregation does not have the same
long-established history that "trade or business" has, nor is the
concept found hundreds of times throughout the Code. "Trade or
business," on the other hand, has a long judicial history, is used
frequently in various situations in the Code, and has an established
meaning. It is not completely clear that the Treasury Department has
the authority to promulgate regulations that potentially contradict this
long-established history. 163
While the Treasury Department can promulgate regulatory safe
harbors to allow taxpayers to meet requirements laid out in the
Code, 164 it has thus far refrained from offering a regulatory definition
of "trade or business." Furthermore, to the extent the proposed safe
harbor is inconsistent with current judicial or statutory standards for
establishing a trade or business, the Treasury Department would, by
promulgating the safe harbor, effectively announce that it was not
going to enforce the law as it stands. While the Treasury Department
can and has, in certain circumstances, chosen not to enforce a
provision of the Code, 165 it is not good tax administration or practice
for an executive agency to choose to not enforce the law.
163. On a practical level, the issue would be unlikely to arise judicially. Because the proposed
safe harbor is (probably) more liberal than the statutory standard, it would allow more taxpayers
to qualify; a taxpayer could not sue alleging that the standard was overly broad. Likewise, if the
safe harbor rubbed Congress the wrong way, Congress could change the Code to make clear that,
in order to make the election, a taxpayer had to meet the judicial standard for being engaged in a
trade or business. This seems unlikely, however, although if Congress were to overrule the
Treasury's safe harbor retroactively (which it would likely only do it if it found electing taxpayers
abused the provision), there could be detrimental results to some electing traders who failed to
qualify under the more stringent standards.
164. E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-1(e)-(h), (j) (as amended in 1995) (establishing safe harbors
under which a partnership interest will not be treated as readily tradable on a secondary market or
the substantial equivalent thereof).
165. E.g., I.R.S. Notice 2007-4, 2007-1 C.B. 260. In 2004, as part of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004, Congress enacted section 470 of the Code, which was intended to crack
down on the use of partnerships to transfer taxable income from taxable to foreign or otherwise
tax-exempt parties by denying the taxable partners certain deductions in the current year. I.R.C.
§ 470(a) (2006). The provision was arguably overbroad, however, applying to any partnership
with both taxable and tax-exempt partners if the allocation to the tax-exempt partners was
inconsistent over the life of the partnership, notably real estate investment partnerships. Chuck
O'Toole, Technical Corrections Bill Signed, Exempts Partnership from SILO Law, 88 TAX
NOTES TODAY 3 (Jan. 2, 2008). The IRS announced that it would not apply section 470 to certain
nonabusive investment partnerships for taxable years beginning before January 1, 2005. I.R.S.
Notice 2006-2, 2006-1 C.B. 278. It extended its so-called transition relief first for taxable years
beginning before January 1, 2006, id., and again for taxable years beginning before January 1,
2007. I.R.S. Notice 2007-4, 2007-1 C.B. 260. The transition relief, however, was in anticipation
of a technical corrections bill that the Treasury Department anticipated would fix the problem, id.,
rather than because the Treasury Department disagreed with standards contained in the law. In
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One difficulty the Treasury Department would have in crafting
regulations laying out the requisite level of investment activity in
which a person must engage in order to qualify to make the mark-to-
market election is in understanding Congress's purpose in
proscribing investors from making the election. Congress explained
that it expanded the availability of mark-to-market accounting from
dealers to electing traders because mark-to-market accounting
presented a better reflection of income and reduced the opportunity
for manipulation. 166 However, Congress offered no explanation as to
why it chose not to offer the same option to investors. Investors may
have been precluded from electing mark-to-market accounting
because of inertia: investors' losses have traditionally been available
to offset only their capital gains plus $3,000 of ordinary income,
whereas mark-to-market losses would offset any income the investor
had. Although Congress was offering a benefit to traders in
securities, it is possible Congress intended to limit that benefit to a
narrow, targeted group. On the other hand, it may have simply not
occurred to Congress that investors would want to mark their
investments in securities and commodities to market (and that the
boundary between traders and investors would be unclear and
porous). Or there may have been another reason. Without knowing
the reason behind Congress's decision to leave investors out of the
purview of section 475(f) of the Code, the Treasury Department may
not be able to point to legislative history and intent to support its
implementation of the safe harbor. 167
Assuming-as is likely the case-that the Treasury Department
has the authority to make such a safe-harbor regulation, however, it
may not be in the Treasury Department's best interest to do so.
Although the intent to make three hundred trades in the course of a
taxable year may be sufficient to allow a taxpayer to elect to mark
her securities and commodities to market, it may be insufficient for
other purposes, such as permitting a taxpayer's investment expenses
to be frilly deductible, rather than being subject to the 2 percent floor
as miscellaneous itemized deductions. Even if the Treasury
Department were to narrowly target the section 475 election in its
fact, President George W. Bush signed the Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007, which fixed
the overbreadth of I.R.C. § 470, on December 29, 2007. O'Toole, supra, at 3.
166. See 1997 BLUE BOOK, supra note 33, at 180.
167. See Robinson v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 44, 66 (2002).
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safe harbor, the fact remains that "trade or business" occurs
frequently in the Code 168 and, in at least some contexts, it is
advantageous for a taxpayer to be engaged in a trade or business. 169
Because courts have traditionally read "trade or business" as having
a unified definition throughout the Code, "' a regulation with a
different definition, even if the Treasury Department explicitly limits
the definition to the section 475 context, could allow taxpayers to use
the new regulatory definition to argue for a more liberal construction
of "trade or business" in contexts outside section 475. Even though
ultimately this would likely be a losing argument, it would require
resources for the issue to be found and litigated. The proposed safe
harbor would create certainty for taxpayers but would not be a
material revenue raiser for the government. 171 The costs to the
Treasury of creating a more lenient safe harbor, then, may not
outweigh the benefit (if any) that would accrue to the government.
Finally, while a regulatory safe harbor offers clarity to taxpayers
who meet its requirements, it does nothing to solve the underlying
uncertainty. It is possible that a taxpayer who does not reasonably
expect to make three hundred trades a year or to make at least twelve
trades per month may still be a trader in securities or commodities
and would therefore still be required to navigate the courts' trade-or-
business requirements ex ante. Furthermore, such a regulatory
solution would not even begin to answer the question of what
happens to an electing taxpayer who fails to qualify as a trader
(especially if the taxpayer did not use the safe harbor) in a
postelection taxable year. While, for a subset of taxpayers, a
regulatory solution disposes of the question of how a taxpayer can
know in advance whether she is a trader, the question ultimately
remains on the table. Still, "a regulation need not be the only, or even
the best, construction of the statute it purports to implement." 172
168. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 737.
169. Id.
170. See deKrause v. Comm'r, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1362 (1974).
171. While it is true that income would all be taxed at ordinary rates, losses would be fully
deductible at ordinary rates against any income, not just against capital gains plus $3,000 of
ordinary income for individuals. Permitting more taxpayers to make a mark-to-market election
would likely result in a different amount of revenue to the government, but such a difference
should not be material, and it is not entirely clear whether the government would raise more or
less revenue if it permitted fewer taxpayers to make the election.
172. Robinson, 119 T.C. at 69.
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Even if the regulatory implementation of the safe harbor is an
imperfect construction of Congress's intent, offering certainty to
electing traders is a compelling reason to produce these regulations.
D. Enactment of the Safe Harbor
Through Legislative Means
In contrast to the Treasury Department, Congress clearly has the
authority to clarify the requirements a taxpayer must meet in order to
mark her securities to market. Congress is not constrained by the
existing legislation, because it can rewrite that legislation. In
rewriting the legislation, moreover, it could remove the trade-or-
business requirement from the requirements to make an election and
thus remove the election from extant judicial precedent. The new
legislation could be as simple as expressly granting the Treasury
Department the authority to define the criteria a taxpayer must meet
in order to elect mark-to-market treatment or as complicated as a
complete rewriting of the provisions of section 475(f).
Simply granting the Treasury Department regulatory authority,
however, is most likely insufficient to solve the problems for some of
the same reasons that the Treasury Department's writing of the safe
harbor regulations without such clear authority is problematic. The
express grant would solve the question of whether the Treasury
Department was authorized to create the safe harbor, but as long as
the Code uses the term "trader," the full force of law surrounding
"trade or business" is implicated. Even with a mandate that
encompassed only defining "trader" for purposes of the mark-to-
market election, taxpayers could argue in other areas in which it was
advantageous to be engaged in a trade or business that the section
475(f) safe harbor was analogous to and, indeed, the clearest
statement available of the criteria required to be engaged in a trade or
business. 173
A better solution, then, would be to rewrite the provision in a
way that excises any implication of a trade-or-business requirement.
This could be as simple as changing the terminology so that, for
173. Where the Code is ambiguous about the proper tax treatment of a taxpayer or
transaction, taxpayers and the IRS frequently look to analogous situations or transactions for
guidance as to the appropriate tax treatment. See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, 2004-32 C.B. 168
(asking for comments on what current tax regime was most analogous to credit default swaps and
therefore most appropriate to apply to this type of transaction).
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example, rather than permitting a "trader" to elect, section 475(f)
allows a "qualified short-term investor" to make the mark-to-market
election. '14 By making a clean break from the term "trader," or
anything else that indicates that the standard is tied to the rules for
being engaged in a trade or business, there is no danger of the new
standard bleeding over into inappropriate or inapposite uses.
Creating a new taxonomy in the Code, of course, may raise its
own problems. First the new term 175 must be defined. Congress may
choose to do this in the Code, or it may delegate such authority to the
Treasury Department. If, however, it delegates the authority to the
Treasury Department, even if Congress suggests the contours of the
definition in the legislative history or in the Code itself, the definition
will be unclear until the Treasury Department promulgates and
174. In addition, in making such a change, it would probably be valuable for Congress to
include language in the legislative history indicating that the change was intended to make a
complete break with the trade-or-business standard.
175. While this Article proposes "qualified short-term investor," a phrase descriptive of the
type of taxpayer that Congress seems to want to permit to make a mark-to-market election, there
is nothing special about this phrase such that it is the terminology that Congress must use to
clarify the criteria for the election. The most important point to keep in mind, however, is that, in
order to avoid the problems associated with the term "trader," the new term needs to be a term
otherwise unused in the Code.
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finalizes the regulations. '76 And the Treasury Department's
production of regulations is not always timely. 1'
If Congress were to define "qualified short-term investor," it
would be advisable to trace the contours discussed above. ' Because
the goals of providing a safe harbor for mark-to-market elections
ultimately include providing clarity to taxpayers prior to their entry
into any transaction, creating an incentive for taxpayers to pay taxes
based on a closer approximation of their Haig-Simons income, and
facilitating compliance with the tax law, a subjective bright-line rule
would be most apposite. If Congress were to require that a qualified
short-term investor reasonably believe that she would engage in at
least three hundred securities or commodities transaction in a year,
with at least twelve in each month, the election would remain
available only to those who would, after the close of the taxable year,
likely be able to claim for other purposes that they had been engaged
in the trade or business of trading in securities or commodities. If, on
the other hand, Congress were to give the Treasury Department the
176. For example, the classification of an instrument as debt or as equity creates significant
and distinct tax consequences. However, both the Supreme Court and Congress have consistently
declined to clearly define the line dividing debt and equity. William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal
Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV.
369, 369-70 (1971). In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. section 385, id. at 370 n.10, which
authorized the Treasury Department to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated . . . as stock or
indebtedness." I.R.C. § 385(a) (2006). Along with granting the Treasury Department authority to
issue regulations, Congress listed certain factors that the Treasury Department should take into
account in the regulations to determining whether an instrument was debt or equity. Id. § 385(b).
The Treasury Department issued the debt-equity regulations in 1980, which were to become
effective for corporate interests created after April 30, 1981, in order to provide time for
taxpayers to become comfortable with the new rules. T.D. 7747, 1981-1 C.B. 141. The effective
date was extended a number of times, however, with changes to the regulations made each time.
T.D. 7822, 1982-2 C.B. 84; T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168. Finally, in
1983, the regulations under section 385 were withdrawn, T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69, and as of
the date of this Article-almost forty years since section 385(a) was enacted and more than a
quarter century after the Treasury Department attempted to promulgate regulations for the first
time-no debt-equity regulations have been enacted. In spite of what guidance exists in section
385, taxpayers still look to the ad hoc judicially determined factors in order to determine whether
an instrument is debt or equity. See, e.g., Flint Indus. Inc. v. Comm'r, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 778
(2001) ("We proceed to examine the advances under the traditional multifactor approach.").
177. While the possible delay between the need for regulations and their enactment is perhaps
most starkly demonstrated in the currently approximately forty-year wait for regulations under
section 385, that is not the sole regulatory delay; even when the Treasury Department
acknowledges the need for regulations, it does not always move promptly. For example, although
it recognized in 2004 that taxpayers needed guidance on the appropriate tax treatment of credit
default swaps, I.R.S. Notice 2004-52, C.B. 168, it has still not provided any guidance. See
Brunson, supra note 16, at 2-4.
178. See supra Part VI.B.
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authority to issue regulations defining "qualified short-term
investor," Congress could nonetheless give the Treasury Department
an outline of what it intended those regulations to look like. 179
Whether Congress decides to define "qualified short-term
investor" (or whatever other term it chooses to use) itself or assign
the Treasury Department to define the term, however, introducing a
new test to the Code will increase its complexity. Although the
definition of "trader" lacks clarity and is unworkable except in
hindsight, the dealer-trader-investor taxonomy nonetheless plays a
significant part in several Code sections. ' A new Code provision,
based around a new definition, changes existing underlying
assumptions and requires taxpayers and their advisors (as well as the
IRS and the courts) to learn the organizational schema and determine
how to most aptly apply the schema in their ordinary course of
business. Nevertheless, the benefits of providing taxpayers with
certainty in electing mark-to-market accounting outweighs the
potential detriment of added complexity.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the election for traders to mark their positions in
securities and commodities to market was introduced into the Code
in 1997, 181 there has been very little analysis of whether it works as
179. It is not uncommon in the Code for Congress to give the secretary of the Treasury
Department authority to issue regulations while, at the same time, telling the secretary roughly
what the regulations should say. For example, section 1276 of the Code provides rules for the
treatment of accrued market discount on the disposition of a debt instrument. The section ends:
(d) Special rules
Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary-
(1) rules similar to the rules of subsection (b) of section 1245 shall apply for
purposes of this section; except that-
(A) paragraph (1) of such subsection shall not apply,
(B) an exchange qualifying under section 354(a), 355(a), or 356(a) (determined
without regard to subsection (a) of this section) shall be treated as an exchange
described in paragraph (3) of such subsection, and
(C) paragraph (3) of section 1245(b) shall be applied as if it did not contain a
reference to section 351, and
(2) appropriate adjustments shall be made to the basis of any property to reflect gain
recognized under subsection (a).
I.R.C. § 1276(d) (2006). Although the Treasury Department is tasked with writing the
regulations, the Code makes clear what contours those regulations are to follow.
180. See Boyle, supra note 41, at 737.
181. See 1997 BLUE BOOK, supra note 33, at 180.
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well as it should. What literature has been written about section
475(f), however, universally acknowledges the difficulties of
knowing whether an electing party qualifies as being engaged in the
trade or business of trading in securities, a prerequisite to making the
election. 182 The problems are compounded by the courts' application
of a stringent set of trade-or-business requirements to investors who
have attempted to make a late election in order to take advantage of
losses that they incurred but failed to realize, rightfully blocking such
abusive behavior but making the standards for a timely election even
more difficult for taxpayers to meet.
This Article has added to the critical exploration of section
475(f) of the Code by demonstrating that the standard for
determining whether a person is engaged in a trade or business,
although not completely clear in any event, works well enough when
it is invoked after the taxable year to which it applies (for example,
in order to determine whether expenses are fully deductible or are
miscellaneous itemized deductions). There is no reason why a
taxpayer's status cannot be different from one year to another.
It has also demonstrated that a taxpayer cannot have the
information she needs to make such an evaluation at any time
materially before the end of the taxable year. 183 Although she may
intend to make frequent trades, capturing short-term movements in
the values of securities and commodities, she cannot know whether
she will follow that trading pattern or not. That is, it is impossible for
a taxpayer to know, at the time she must make the election, whether
she qualifies to make it.
This Article has also demonstrated that, because of the current
uncertainty surrounding who may make a mark-to-market election,
because of the desirability of bringing taxable income in line with
Haig-Simons income, and the limited downside to liberalizing the
availability of the election, the section 475(f) election should be
available to all taxpayers. Even if the requirements for making a
182. See supra Part III.
183. In theory, there is no reason why she could not know sometime late in the year. By
December, if her trading activities have qualified up to that point as a trade or business, chances
are that, even if she fails to trade in December, she will have met the requirements of engaging in
the trade or business of trading securities for the year. However, the year is also virtually over by
that time, and the investor very likely has some idea whether her net positions will be gains or
losses, and such a late deadline for making the election would not materially prevent her from
taking advantage of her foreknowledge in deciding whether to make the election.
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mark-to-market election are not liberalized, however, it is necessary
that, at a minimum, a safe harbor be provided under which a taxpayer
can know ex ante whether she qualifies to make the mark-to-market
election.
Only Congress can eliminate the trade-or-business requirement,
but short of its elimination, either the Treasury Department or
Congress can create a subjective safe harbor, either defining what it
means to be a trader for purposes of the election or taking the
prerequisites out of the realm of "trade or business" altogether.
Either solution has potential downsides. Even with the potential
downsides, though, the upside potential of the proposed safe harbor
(i.e., providing taxpayers with certainty that they qualify to make a
mark-to-market election) is a net improvement over the uncertainty
that currently underlies section 475(f).
Although theoretically it would be preferable for Congress to act
to solve the problem, realistically, Congress may not be motivated to
make such a change. The Treasury Department, on the other hand,
routinely creates safe harbors and makes other decisions about the
administration of the Code. 184 While it is not altogether clear that the
Treasury Department has the authority to create a safe harbor as
outlined in this Article, it is unlikely that any taxpayer would have
standing to challenge the requirements because the safe harbor would
ease them. Furthermore, the Treasury Department can and does
regularly solicit input from taxpayers who will be affected by new
regulations. 85 It certainly could and would receive taxpayer
comments on any safe harbor it intended to create, further assuring
that the safe harbor would meet the needs of the relevant community
of investors in securities and commodities.
While neither eliminating the trader requirement altogether nor
establishing the safe harbor proposed by this Article is a panacea for
all the troubles with the taxation of investment income, either
solution would solve significant problems surrounding the mark-to-
market election. The most notable of these is the impossibility of a
taxpayer knowing, at the time she is required to make the election,
whether she will be a trader in securities and therefore be qualified to
make the election. This also creates certain problems by adding an
184. See supra Parts VI.C-D.
185. E.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(g)-l(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 4746, 4748 (Jan. 18, 2001).
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as-yet-unknown regime to the Code-one without a history on which
taxpayers can draw. The safe harbor, however, is not terribly
complex and can be relatively easy to describe in the Code itself or
in simple regulations that the Treasury Department could write and
release reasonably quickly. On a net basis, however, the benefits of
either permitting any taxpayer, without limitation, to elect mark-to-
market accounting or implementing the proposed safe harbor
outweigh the detriments because they make it possible for taxpayers
to know that they are qualified, and taxpayers can confidently elect
to mark their securities positions to market.
It is beneficial to provide certainty to taxpayers. Mark-to-market
accounting better reflects taxpayers' Haig-Simons income and
prevents tax arbitrage using the timing option, which prompts
taxpayers to accelerate their deductions and defer the recognition of
taxable income. Although taxpayers do not always have access to
information or liquid capital to make mark-to-market accounting a
practical choice, where taxpayers are able and willing to choose
mark-to-market accounting, the Code should make it possible and
convenient to do so. This Article provides a step toward making
mark-to-market accounting a more realistic possibility for more
taxpayers.
